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Three experiments were conducted to investigate
the effect of

stimulus probability on perceptual encoding.
role of an abstract code as

In Experiment 1,

the

mediator of the effect was tested.

a

Subjects viewed and responded to stimuli in conditions
which either

encouraged or discouraged the use of abstract codes.

Contrary to

prediction, the effect of probability tended to be greater at

a

low

level of stimulus contrast when the use of abstract codes was
dis-

couraged, and unaffected by contrast when their use was encouraged.

Subjects

1

responses to

a

questionnaire indicated that the use of

abstract codes was determined to some extent by individual strategies.

It was proposed that it is unnecessary to appeal to an

abstract code that differs from

probability effect at encoding.

a

name code as

a

mediator of the

In Experiments 2 and 3,

the degree

to which the probability effect at encoding may be explained by

sequential expectancy effects was examined.

The probability effect

was greater at low contrast in Experiment 2, and the results of

Experiment

3

indicated

a

similar trend.

trast effect did not vary as

a

The magnitude of the con-

function of the preceding stimulus

sequence in either experiment.

Previous results have shown that the

size of the contrast effect does not
depend on whether or not the

ensuing stimulus is preceded by

a

valid cue.

These findings were

interpreted as suggesting that the probability
effect at encoding is
the result of

a

relatively static mechanism in which
expectancies do

not shift over trials.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The assertion that the acquisition
of information may be guided

by preexisting knowledge and other
nonstimulus factors is

a

common one.

It is the basis for the top-down/bottom-up
distinction, and has been

invoked in models of information processing
that run the gamut from per

ception to word recognition to comprehension
(e.g., Becker and Killion,
1977; Kintsch and van Dijk,

Minsky, 1975; Morton, 1969).

1978; Meyer,

Schvaneveldt

,

and Ruddy,

1975;

The present study is an attempt to expli-

cate the mechanism by which nonstimulus factors
influence perceptual

encoding.

Perceptual encoding is defined here as the set of
processes

including and temporally preceding the identification of

a

stimulus.

For ease of reference, nonstimulus factors that potentially
influ-

ence the perceptual encoding process will be termed "cognitive"
variables.

The use of this label is not meant to imply anything about the

degree to which these factors may be under the subject's conscious control.

This remains an empirical question.

Some examples of cognitive

variables are psychological factors such as expectancy and incentive
(or motivation), and experimentally induced factors such as adjustment
to task instructions,

probability.

stimulus repetition, and in particular, stimulus

It will ultimately be desirable to assess the effects of

each of these variables in turn with respect to
mechanisms.

Initially, though,

I

a

model of encoding

have selected stimulus probability

as the cognitive variable of interest, with the goal of establishing

1

a

general m odel of the functioning of
cognitive factors based on the

results obtained via this variable.

The Stimulus Pro bability Effect
and Its Loci

Stimulus probability is defined as the
relative frequency with

which

a

given stimulus is presented during

a task.

Two common ways of

manipulating probability have been to vary the
number of equally probable stimuli and to vary the presentation
probabilities of each stimulus.

Hyman (1953) used both of these manipulations in
demonstrating

that reaction time (RT) is

a

linear function of the amount of informa-

tion per stimulus presentation.

He found that RT increased with

decreasing stimulus probability.

Although in typical manipulations of stimulus probability the
effect builds up over trials, effects due to instructions stating
stimulus probabilities have also been observed.

For example, Bartz

(1971) varied the number of equiprobable stimuli and informed subjects
of the size of the stimulus set beforehand.

When RTs on the first trial

were analyzed, results showed the same relationship of RT to amount of

information as Hyman found.

This suggests that the prior expectancy of

the subject, as well as experience in the task, may contribute to the

probability effect.

This possibility will only be mentioned here, but

is worth noting with respect to the potential involvement of conscious

control in the mechanism underlying the probability effect.
A good deal of past research has been concerned with establishing
the locus of the probability effect.

As a result, there have been two

major classes of explanation regarding the effect.

One of these main-

s

tains that .nor, probable sU,„„li
are identilied faster; Lb, other
states

that probability has its effect at
the stage of response retrieval.

paradigm that has been nsed extensively
issue is that of

Laberge

assigned to two responses

attempting to decide tbe

in

Tweedy (1964).

;,,„!

Three or more stimuli are

order to compare RTs to stimuli

in

One

that differ

in presentation probability but
require tbe same response, and to com-

pare KTs to stimuli

that share the same presentation
probability, but

require responses associated with different
probabilities.

assumed that RT differences
locus of

the

of

lirst type implicate

the probability effect, wh

i

I

e

differences

of

suggest an effect at the response decision stage.

is

It

perceptual

a

second type

tin-

Results of studies

Uiing this paradigm have been mixed, with some studies .suggesting
thai

mote prQb«bla stimuli are identified Lister, others that

response pro-

cesses are primarily affected, and still others which sugges

probability effect

nents (e.g., Dillon,
hegi and
I"

ol

and llobb ie

,

composed

is

,

1

I
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these conflicting results,
a

perceptual

LaHerge,

1970;

LOCUS

ol

interpretation

should be noted that

il

the

the probability effect

loi

Smith
on

i

the

The os and his co-workers (Theios,
i

Haviland, Traupman, and Moy
re t

r

i

eva

I

o

1

appropriate

seems equally plausible, but

nature

it

i

won

s f

I

d

i')/j)

f

i

proposed

mu us - response
I

a

(

logic which

based on RT

ol

processing.

no

is

I

Theios,

!')/'>;

mechanism based

S-K ) ma pp ngs wh
i

localize probability e

response selection stage

lace

the

in

differences to unequally probable stimuli with the same response
necessarily valid.

the

.

addition to the obvious difficulty

implicates

that

and response compo-

Hawkins, Thomas, and Drury,

;

')(.<) )

both perceptual

ol

t

f

f

ec ts

<

>

I

The mechanism

i

<

li

this
i

assum ed to be comprised of

a

dynamic memory stack of stimulus
repre-

sentations paired with their responses.
serial manner until

The stack is searched in

a

match with the presented stimulus
is found, and

a

ordering in the stack is based on
frequency and recency of S-R occurrences
A second approach that has been
utilized in determining the locus

of the stimulus probability effect relies
on the additive factors

methodology of Sternberg (1969).

The notion is that if the magnitude

of the probability effect varies depending
on the level of

known to affect only

a

a

variable

given stage of processing, then it may be con-

cluded that probability has at least some of its
effect on that stage.
Two caveats must be heeded concerning this approach:
that probability interacts with

a

(1) The

finding

factor known to affect one stage of

processing does not preclude the possibility that probability may also
affect another stage, and (2) care must be taken in interpreting additivity, as illustrated by Taylor (1976).
a

To use one of his examples,

stage labelled "stimulus encoding" may in fact be composed of several

substages.

It is possible that two factors may affect two different

substages, thus failing to interact.

The typical conclusion would be

that at least one of the factors does not influence encoding.

A more

reasonable conclusion might be that the encoding "stage" actually
involves two stages.

Miller and Pachella (1973) conducted

a

study which illustrates the

use of the additive factors methodology in localizing the probability
effect.

They manipulated stimulus probability and stimulus quality in

naming task and

a

memory scanning task requiring

a

a

button-press response

Stilus

quality was manipulated by varying
the contrast, or intensity,
of visually presented digits.
They found that the magnitude of
the

probability effect increased with
decreasing stimulus quality in both
tasks.
Based on the assumption that
stimulus quality affects encoding
but not response processing,
their conclusion was that stimulus
probability has an effect at the encoding
stage.
(I will discuss this assump-

tion later on.)

This interaction of stimulus contrast
and probability

has been reported

a

number of times in the literature (e.g.,
Miller,

1979; Miller and Pachella,

1976; Stanovich and Pachella,

1977).

The additive factors method has also
been used to yield results

that suggest

a

response locus of the probability effect.

Hawkins,

MacKay, Holley, Friedin, and Cohen
(1973) manipulated S-R compatibility

along with stimulus and response probability in the
LaBerge and Tweedy
(1964) paradigm.

Compatibility was manipulated by asking subjects to

verbally respond to visually presented letters with their
correct names
in the high-compatible condition, and with names of
different predesig-

nated letters in the low-compatible condition.

Two stimuli were mapped

to one response in the task by using as stimuli both upper- and
lower-

case versions of letters of the same name.

compatibility is
encoding.

a

It was assumed that S-R

variable which affects response processes, but not

Hawkins and his co-workers found that the size of the response

probability effect (the difference in RTs to equiprobable stimuli
associated with responses of unequal probabilities) increased with
decreasing S-R compatibility, indicating that both factors operate on
the same (response) stage.

In addition,

they found that the probability

effect resulting from the comparison of RTs to the unequally probable

stimuli sharing the same response
was also affected by varying S-R

compatibility.

That is, the "stimulus"
probability effect was larger

in the low-compatible condition.

This result was interpreted as imply-

ing that probability does not
have any effect on encoding.

The preceding conclusion may be
invalid for at least two reasons.

First, Hawkins and his associates
have implicitly assumed that the

"stimulus" probability manipulation may
affect either an encoding or
response stage, but not both.

In other words,

they have ignored the

possibility that probability may affect both
stages.
a

a

In order to make

more legitimate claim, they might have also
varied contrast in order

to provide the opportunity of observing
an interaction that would impli

cate an encoding locus.

Second, it was assumed that mechanisms under-

lying the probability effect are the same regardless
of the nature of

stimuli or task.

This may be

a

faulty assumption.

Using

a

memory scan

ning task, Miller and Pachella (1976) found that stimulus
probability

interacted with contrast when the stimuli were digits, but not when the
stimulus set consisted of nonsense figures.

They concluded that proba-

bility affects the process of naming the stimulus, since names are
readily available to the subject for digits, but not nonsense figures.

Miller and Pachella also observed

a

sizeable probability effect for the

nonsense figures, which suggests that

a

response locus for the effect

exists along with the encoding locus suggested by the contrast by

probability interaction.
In the study by Hawkins and his colleagues,

letter stimuli were

responded to with their appropriate names in the high-compatible condition, but with names of other letters in the low-compatible condition.

Whereas subjects in the former
condition could easily utilize

name in

a

executing their responses, this
would be mU ch more difficult for
subjects in the latter condition.
In fact, the readily available
name of
the stimulus should actually
interfere with the correct response in
this

condxtxon.

In light of the Miller and
Pachella (1976) results, it seems

likely that processing in the two
conditions was fundamentally different.

If this were the case, a more
accurate interpretation of the

results of the study by Hawkins and his
co-workers would be that the

mechanism underlying the probability effect
at the response stage

is

also affected by S-R compatibility, while
the mechanism at the encoding

stage is not.

Their observation of the compatibility by probability

interaction then follows directly.
If this interpretation is correct, there should
be a probability

main effect for those stimuli in the high-compatible condition
that
shared the same response, but appeared with unequal frequencies.

main effect was not observed.
observe

a

This

However, Miller and Pachella (1973) did

significant main effect of probability with an absolute mean

difference of roughly the same magnitude (15-20 milliseconds) as was

present in the study of Hawkins and his colleagues.

The latter employed

relatively few trials with their subjects (240 versus 800 in Miller and
Pachella, 1973).

If,

indeed, the probability effect is one which builds

over trials, it may be that subjects did not undergo enough trials for
the effect to sufficiently build up.

In support of this interpretation,

the advantage of high- versus low-probability stimuli in the Hawkins
et al.
a

study increases over blocks.

Finally, there is some evidence of

speed-accuracy trade-off, with low-probability items showing

a

larger

.

,

.

8

error rate.

This could have reduced the
probability effect in the RT

data
On the basis of the results
reviewed up to this point, it seems

reasonable to think that stimulus
probability may have its effect at both
encoding and response stages of processing.
Most of the studies that 1
have mentioned have been primarily
concerned with establishing the locus
of the effect, and to

mechanism involved.

lesser extent (if at all) with specifyiug
the

a

As previously mentioned,

the description of the

mechanism underlying the probability effect,
particularly with regard
to encoding,

the primary objective of this project.

is

Accordingly,

several studies will now be reviewed which
represent attempts to des-

cribe this mechanism, or to
a

I

I

encod ng

eel

i

and when

,

at

will

I

i

least predict when probab
not

i

I

i

t

will

y

.

Assumption Localizing the Effect of Contrast at Encoding

Before considering the research related to the effects of stimulus

probability on encoding,

will discuss the assumption which

1

localizes

the effect of contrast manipulation at the encoding stage of processing.

assumption

Tin:;

t

he add

i

I

Lve

crit

is

i

<

t

1

I

ov (Ionic

some*

:;

in

i

in

I

Factors mo hod<

the probability effect.
ox

i

>

I

ill

in

<>p,y

For this
.support

o

The as sump t ion that contrast
findings
(

1

965 )

monocu

1

I

I

rom the

ound that

a r

I

y

,

hut

th« studies

<>l

<

's

t .1

b

I

reason,
this

I

a

M ec

i

t

s

Ii

i

a

i

an encoding

n

important

is

it

I

i

not

I

i

gh

t

LOCUI 0 J

that

there

111

on cod

i

n>>

Literature on visual mas king
.1

have employed

li.it

t

(lash of fee t ively ma sks

when presented dichoptically

t

F<

>

a

COIlliatenl

:;

example

»

i

o

[n

1

m

1

the

with

SchJ

(

1

Lei

presented

i

1

1

1

s

t

case

target and .ask presumably travel
via the sa me peripheral pathway,
permitting the .ask to have its
effect at an early level of
processing.
The convergence of the two is
.ore central in the dichoptic
condition,
however.
A light flash ma y be thought of
as reducing the contrast of
the stimulus, and peripheral
processing may be considered to occur ear-

lier than central processing.

found that

a

Furthermore, Turvey (1973) and Schiller

pattern mask is effective in dichoptic
presentation, thus

ruling out the possibility that stimuli
presented in this manner are

simply immune to masking.
Pachella and Fisher (1969) found that asmyptotic
performance in

a

discrimination task was unaffected by luminance
level, but was lowered
by

increasing stimulus similarity.

This supports the claim that the

effect of contrast is on the rate of information accrual,
rather than on
the product of the identification process.

Finally, Hardzinski and Pachella (1980) used

a

memory scanning

task with alphabetic stimuli, and asked subjects to respond on
the basis
of either

a

physical or name match.

Subjects were presented with memory

sets of various sizes, which were comprised of upper- and lowercase ver-

sions of

a

letter in the name match condition, letters of the same case

in a control condition, and single versions of letters of either case in

the physical match condition.

Stimulus contrast was also manipulated.

Only the scanning rate in the physical match condition was affected by
contrast, and this result could not be replicated in
ment.

a

second experi-

Hardzinski and Pachella interpreted these results as indicating

that an abstract internal representation is obtained from which the

effects of the contrast manipulation have been removed.

It is this

10

representation that is used for comparison
in the memory scanning stage.
The effect of stimulus contrast
can thus be presumed to have a
locus
before the memory scanning stage
(hence before
at an encoding stage.

a

response stage), namely,

The aforementioned results of studies
in which

stimulus contrast was manipulated suggest
that the assumption localizing
the effect at encoding is a reasonable
one.

The Probability Effect and Its Potential
Causes
This section is divided into two subsections.

The rationale for

this division may be understood if the effect
of probability is analyzed
in terms of a state in the subject which
somehow arises due to the

probability manipulation, and the causes of this state.

However it

arises, once there, the state manifests itself in some way
in the pro-

cessing of

a

stimulus.

The studies and models discussed in the first

subsection address the manner in which this (the probability effect)
occurs.

In contrast,

the studies reviewed in the second subsection

concern themselves with how the subject comes to be in
at a given point in time.

In other words,

a

certain state

how does the manipulation of

probability produce varying states in the subject such that their
effects on processing may be observed?

Mechanisms of the probability effect

.

As already mentioned, Miller

and Pachella (1976) observed additivity between probability and con-

trast when nonsense stimuli were used, but not for digits.

clusion was that probability has some of its effect upon

identification stage.

a

The con-

stimulus

In an attempt to corroborate this conclusion,

11

Pachella and Miller (1976)
manipulated

stilus

probability and contrast

in a letter matching task
(Posner and Mitchell,

1967).

tity instructions, Pachella and
Miller observed

a

Under name iden-

probability effect

on name match and different
trials, but not on physical match
trials.

They reasoned that on physical match
trials,

a

relatively fast response

could be made on the basis of physical
identity alone, and this response

would not have to involve

a

naming process.

physically identical, however,
involved.

The finding of

a

a

If the stimuli are not

naming process would presumably be

probability effect for only those trials

that required the naming of the stimulus
suggests that probability has
an effect on stimulus identification.

In further support of this con-

clusion, Pachella and Miller failed to observe

a

probability effect for

any trial type (physical match, name match but different
case, or different) when responses were made on the basis of physical
identity.
A troublesome aspect of the Pachella and Miller study is the
fail-

ure to observe a contrast by probability interaction for the trials in

which stimulus identification should have been involved.

They suggested

that the effect of degradation may have been removed by the early physical comparison process as a result of testing for physical identity.

However, this suggestion leads to the prediction of an additive rela-

tionship between contrast and trial type.
not significant at

a

While this interaction was

conventional level, there was

that the effect might have been present.

a

strong indication

Under the name identity cri-

terion, the effect of contrast was 72, 40, and 49 milliseconds for physical match, name match, and different trials, respectively.
of this study are thus more equivocal than might be desired.

The results

12

Miller (1979) conducted

a

number of experiments in an attempt
to

describe the underlying mechanisms of
the probability effect at the

encoding stage of processing.

He used additive factors logic and
man-

ipulated stimulus quality, pairing two
stimuli of different probabilities with one response, and two
equiprobable stimuli (each visually

similar to one member of the first pair)
with another.

An RT difference

between two stimuli of the first type is
referred to as

a

bility effect, and

difference between stimuli

a

indirect probability effect.

of

direct proba-

the second type is an

An example will explain the reasoning

behind the use of these terms.
In

one experiment, Miller used the letter pairs

tice that
a

member

a

of

each pair has

member of the other pair.

anced, but

a

I-K and T-R

No-

.

good deal of featural overlap with

The assignment of stimuli was counterbal-

for some subjects

I

and K were assigned to one response and

appeared with probabilities of .46 and .04, respectively.

T and

R

were

assigned to the other response and appeared with probability of .25.

Each response was thus equally likely.

II

probability was to have the

effect of sensitizing specific feature detectors such that more probable
features are more readily identified, one might expect

bility effect when comparing RTs to
comparing RTs to T and

R.

I

and K, and an

direct proba-

a

indirect effect when

If such effects are present, then they should

be affected by contrast, assuming feature detection takes place during

encoding.
at

a

lower

Miller
I

eve

bility effect.
ity does not

a

I

I

of

ound

a

direct

contrast, but

probability eflecl

wli

failed to observe an

i

<

li

was greatei

indirect proba-

He interpreted these results as evidence that probabilfleet

featural

processing, and hypothesized that proba-

13

bility either affects

a

detector which is sensitive to
the entire visnal

for m of the stimulus or the na
m i„g process (cf. Miller and
Parhelia,
1976; Pachella and Miller,

1976).

In order to distinguish between
these two alternatives, Miller ran

an experiment using the same task,
but with different stimuli.

The

stimulus set consisted of two versions
of each of the uppercase letters
A and Y.

One version of each letter was paired
with

a

single response,

and the rest of the procedure was
identical to the previous experiment.
If probability affects sensitivity to
the entire physical form, then one

should observe

a

direct probability effect which interacts with
contrast,

and no indirect probability effect.

Since it is not possible to perform

this task solely on the basis of the name of the
stimulus (since each

name is associated with both responses), the stimulus
identification
(or naming) explanation predicts that there should be
no contrast by

probability interaction in the direct condition.
Miller observed

a

direct probability effect, but there was no con-

trast by probability interaction in the direct condition.
find an indirect probability effect.

identification explanation.

He did not

These results favor the stimulus

Although it was logically possible for

subjects to make their responses on the basis of the stimulus name cou-

pled with some sort of physical information, it appears that subjects
did not do this.

In fact, Miller reported that there was a reverse

probability effect for the error rates in the indirect condition, suggesting that the overlearned stimulus name became available in spite of
subjects'
is,

strategies and actually served to interfere in the task.

the name of the more probable stimulus in the direct condition

That

.

became associated with that
response, so that when the other
stimulus of
the same name was presented,
subjects had to combat a tendency
to respond incorrectly

Miller was also interested in whether
it is necessarily the activation of a name code per se that
is affected by probability when
the con-

trast by probability interaction is
observed, or if some more general

abstract code might also be affected.

A description of the stimuli

that he used to address this question
should clarify the notion of an

abstract code.

Miller used

a

set of four stimuli that may be thought

of as consisting of the orthogonal combination
of binary values on two

dimensions.
and

a

Each stimulus was comprised of

bar position

the shape).

(a

a

shape (an X or

a

diamond)

horizontal bar which was either above or below

The task and the assignment of stimuli to responses were

the same as in the other experiments.

To give an example, the X-with-

underbar and diamond-with-overbar might be paired with one response
and
be the direct probability stimuli, while the X-with-overbar and the

diamond-with-underbar would be paired with the other response.
As in the previous experiment, subjects cannot respond solely on

the basis of the shape name, since it is paired with both responses; nor

does it seem likely that subjects would invent their own names for each

stimulus, since this did not occur in other experiments using nonsense

stimuli (Miller and Pachella, 1976), or in Miller's Experiment

3.

Miller argued that in contrast to those experiments, however, the stimuli may easily be uniquely identified on the basis of their values on
two salient dimensions, corresponding to the notion of an abstract code.

Miller (Experiment 4) observed both direct and indirect probability
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effects with these stimuli, but
only the former was sensitive
to contrast.
This result is consistent with
the possibility that subjects
utilized abstract codes in encoding
the stimuli, and that the
activation
of these codes was affected by
probability.
As Miller pointed out, the

finding that indirect probability did
not interact with contrast suggests

a

different mechanism may be involved
than the one underlying the

direct probability effect.
To further test the notion that probability
has an effect on the

activation of an abstract code, Miller
(Experiment

6)

asked his subjects

to perform a task that was identical
to that of Experiment 4, but in

which the stimuli could not be identified on the
basis of their dimensional values.

Although Miller referred to the stimuli of Experiment

as consisting of two binary features,

4

it may be less ambiguous to adopt

some working definitions that have been proposed by Garner
(1978).

suggested that an attribute is any variable property of

a

He

set of stim-

uli, a feature is an attribute of a stimulus that either does not
exist
or exists at only a single level within
is an
a

a

stimulus set, and

a

dimension

attribute that exists at some positive level within each member of

stimulus set.

Thus, the stimulus set of Experiment 4 possessed the

dimensions of shape and bar position.

In contrast, the four stimuli

used in Experiment

a

6

were comprised of

shape dimension (an X or

a

box)

and one of four features (under- or overbar for the X, vertical or hori-

zontal bar inside the box)

.

The S-R mapping was such that

a

could not be made solely on the basis of the stimulus shape.

response
Since

dimensional values presumably were represented as abstract codes in

Experiment

4,

and since this representation was not possible for the

combination of task and stimuli in
Experiment

6,

Miller predicted that

probability would not have an effect
on encoding in the latter experiment.

The results indicated

a

direct probability effect, no indirect

effect, and no interaction with
contrast, thus upholding Miller's prediction.

He interpreted these results to mean
that stimulus probability

may affect not only the activation of
abstract, meaningful code.

a

name code, but also any

The implication is that somehow dimensions

are meaningful or abstract, and features
are not.

Logogen model

.

Miller (1979) explained his results using

of Morton's (1969) logogen model.

logogen that may correspond to either

a

a

particular

name code or an abstract code,

The effect of probability at the

encoding level is to adjust the threshold at which
vated.

version

According to this conception, the

encoding of the visual features of the stimulus activates

in the sense described earlier.

a

a

logogen is acti-

Specifically, logogens corresponding to highly probable stimuli

are assumed to have lower thresholds than those corresponding to less

probable stimuli.

Thus, the amount of evidence necessary to activate

logogens of more probable stimili is less, meaning that those logogens

may be activated faster.

If one makes the additional assumption that

the effect of contrast is on the rate of accumulation of visual fea-

tures (cf. Pachella and Fisher,

1969), this leads to the interaction

between the effects of probability and contrast at the encoding level.
The understanding of this mechanism is relatively straightforward
for logogens corresponding to the name of

a

stimulus, but is less so for

logogens corresponding to abstract codes, as would be the case in

Miller's Experiment

4.

In clarifying the process under these circum-

stances, Miller clai med that
there need not be

dence between stimuli and logogens.
a

a

one-to-one correspon-

In his Experiment 4,

for example,

logogen would exist for each value
on the two dimensions.

stimulus would activate two logogens
in this case, and

a

A given

response would

be made on the basis of the
particular combination of activated logogens.

The direct probability by contrast
interaction is thus in accor-

dance with the model.
is the

What does not seem to be in accordance,
however,

additivity of contrast and probability in the
indirect condition

As Miller pointed out, each stimulus in
the indirect condition had

more probable and

a

a

less probable dimensional value, so it might
be ex-

pected that the facilitating effects would cancel.

This did not happen

however, and Miller proposed that the indirect effect was
due to the

greater salience of the shape dimension over the bar position
dimension
Since the same mechanism is responsible for the indirect probability

effect under this interpretation, one would expect to observe an inter-

action of the effect with contrast, as in the direct probability condition.

The failure to observe such an interaction is problematic for

this interpretation.

Finally, Miller suggested that in situations in which the proba-

bility effect is unaffected by the level of contrast, the subject does
not (or perhaps cannot) utilize abstract codes.

One possible reason

for this is that abstract codes are useful only when

ponse rule is necessary in order to perform the task.
the case,

a

memorized resWhen this is not

subjects may in effect bypass the stimulus identification

stage by setting up direct visual-to-motor linkages, according to

Miller.

It may also be the case that subjects are unable to use an
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abstract code because one simply
does not exist, as in some tasks
using
nonsense stimuli (e.g., Miller,
1979, Experiments 3 and 6; Miller and
Pachella, 1976).

Although it was possible to construct
arbitrary stimu-

lus names for these stimuli,

it may have been that the association

between stimulus and name was too weak
to allow this to be

a

viable

strategy in those tasks.
If the effect of probability at
encoding is to lower the activat-

ing threshold of

a

logogen corresponding to

a

name or abstract code,

it follows that the effect should
transfer from

a

direct probability

condition using uppercase letters (for example) to
an indirect condition using lowercase letters with the same names.

Also, the indirect

probability effect should interact with contrast.

Miller and Hardzinski

(1981) tested these predictions, and found no evidence of transfer

across case.

They also replicated Miller's (1979) finding of no trans-

fer to visually similar letters, providing further evidence against
the sensitizing of feature detectors as

effect.

a

mechanism for the probability

They concluded that probability affects the rate of transmis-

sion of evidence about specific features to

a

specific logogen,

ling this phenomenon "route-specific activation."

mention case-specific sublogogens for
for probability-induced activation.

mit evidence to letter-name logogens.

a

label-

Miller and Hardzinski

given letter as possible sites

These sublogogens would then transHowever,

it

is

not clear how

this explanation would account for effects with non-alphanumeric stimuli
(cf.

Miller, 1979, Experiment 4).

Verification model

.

An alternative mechanism of the probability

effect is provided by the verification model proposed by Becker (1976,

1980; Becker and Killion,

1977).

Although this mo del was originally

intended as an account of word
recognition, Becker has suggested
that it
may be broadened to include
general expectancy effects. According
to
the model, stimulus information
is first stored in sensory
memory, from

which sensory features are extracted
via feature analysis.
sory features serve to activate what

I

These sen-

will call stimulus detectors

(corresponding to Becker's word detectors) by
accumulating in
similar to that in the logogen model.

Up to this point,

a

manner

there is essen-

tially no difference between the verification
model and the logogen
model.

The first difference between the two lies in
the significance of

an activated stimulus detector; namely, the
activation of a stimulus

detector does not correspond to stimulus recognition.

This is because

it is assumed that the output of feature analysis
is limited to the

identification of primitive featural components such as arcs and line
segments.

The output lacks information concerning the relations between

these primitive components.

The purpose of feature analysis, then, is

to specify a set of stimulus detectors

(hereafter referred to as the

sensory feature-defined set) that are consistent with the primitive
featural characteristics of the stimulus.
Once this set has been identified,

a

process known as verification

commences, and it is through this process that the stimulus is actually
identified.

The "stimuli" corresponding to the stimulus detectors are

serially selected, and are used together with additional information
stored with the stimulus detector to construct
stimulus.

a

representation of the

The additional information concerns the relationships among

the primitive features that have been identified.

This information is

presu m ably abstracted from previous
experxence.

The constructed repre-

sentation is compared with the
information in sensory memory, and if
a
good match is obtained, the stimulus
is identified.
If a match is not
obtained, another "stimulus" is
selected and

a

representation is con-

structed and compared with the sensory
information, the process con-

tinuing in this manner until the stimulus
is identified.

Becker has

suggested that the order in which "words"
are selected from the sensory

feature-defined set in
frequency.

word recognition task is determined by word

a

A generalization of this view would be
that the order of

"stimulus" selection is determined by relative
frequency, or probability.
This is only one way that probability may have an effect
according
to the verification model.

of expectancy.

A second possibility arises via the factor

In this case, an expectation of a particular stimulus

by the subject is enough to activate one or more stimulus detectors.

The verification process can thus begin without waiting for feature

analysis to take place.

If it is assumed that more probable stimuli

are correctly expected more often than less probable stimuli, this

mechanism can produce

a

probability effect.

The mechanism responsible for the probability by contrast inter-

action in the verification model is quite different from that in the
logogen model.

It is assumed that contrast has its effect on the fea-

ture analysis process and also on the rate at which information is

stored in sensory memory.

The verification process is assumed to be

unaffected by contrast manipulation.

A highly probable stimulus would

tend to be correctly expected more often and feature analysis thus by-

passed, while processing of less
probable stimuli would more often than
not include feature analysis.
This is because an incorrect expectation

would necessitate the selection of
further "stimuli" from the sensory

feature-defined set.

The effect of contrast will thus tend
to have two

loci (sensory memory and feature
analysis) for less probable stimuli,

and only one (sensory memory) for highly
probable stimuli.

The verifi-

cation model is therefore able to account
for probability and contrast

main effects, and the probability by contrast
interaction.

Furthermore,

this account differs from that of the logogen
model, which uses

a

com-

bination of varied logogen thresholds and varied
rates of accumulation
of evidence to explain these effects.

While neither model is satisfac-

tory in its ability to predict the presence or absence of

a

probability

by contrast interaction, the verification model perhaps is less
so.
Whereas the logogen models assumes that

logogen does not exist for

a

stimuli which are not characterized by abstract codes, the verification

model lacks

a

specific construct such as

logogen, assuming that expec-

a

tancies are not or cannot be generated at

a

perceptual level when stim-

uli are not identified on the basis of abstract codes.

The importance

of the abstract code as a mediator of the probability effect on encoding
is the focus of

Experiment

1

of the present student.

Causes of the probability effect

.

It is possible to conceive of the

probability effect as an indirect result of one or several (more) basic
factors (e.g., Keele, 1973; Posner, 1978).

One candidate for such

factor is expectancy, the conscious anticipation of
lus.

a

a

particular stimu-

RTs to predicted (expected) events are less than to nonpredicted
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events (e.g., Bernstein and Reese,
1967), and subjects tend to correctly
expect frequent events more than
infrequent events (e.g., Myers, 1976).
Thus, the probability effect may
be

ability of

a

a

correct expectation given

greater than the probability of

probable stimulus.

result of the fact that the proba

more probable stimulus will be

correct expectation given

a

less

a

A second factor that may underlie the
probability

effect is stimulus repetition.

Responses to repeated stimuli tend to be

faster than to nonrepeated stimuli (e.g.,
Bertelson, 1963).

bility effect may merely be

a

The proba-

reflection of the fact that stimuli are

repeated more often than infrequent stimuli.
A number of investigators have examined the extent
to which expec-

tancy, repetition, and probability effects may be identified
with one

another.

The procedure in these studies has been to look for the pre-

sence of one effect with the other factor(s) held constant.

If the

effect is detected, it may be concluded that the factors ought not to be

identified with one another.

Keele (1969) failed to observe

tion effect for trials preceded by an incorrect prediction.
Pitz (1970) obtained

a

similar result, but observed

a

a

repeti-

Geller and

residual repeti-

tion effect when two or more successive repetitions occurred.

Bernstein

and Reese (1965) manipulated probability via the number of alternative

stimuli presented and observed
dicted stimuli.

a

probability effect for incorrectly pre-

Similarly, Hinrichs and Crafts (1971) obtained

a

prob-

ability effect for incorrectly guessed stimuli by directly manipulating
stimulus presentation probability.
On the basis of these results, it may be concluded that the proba-

bility effect does not result solely from expectancy.

In addition,

.

expectancy might underlie the
repetition Pettect,
ff Prt
implying that probability is also distinct from
repetition.
The discrepancy between Keele's
results and those of Geller and
Pitz weakens the latter conclusion,
i

-

though, and suggests that more
than the immediately preceding stimulus

should be considered when examining
sequential effects.
A number of studies have examined
the nature of higher order

sequential effects.

observed

Remington (1969) manipulated probability and

probability effect with sequence held constant.

a

noted significant fifth-order sequential
effects.

He also

(The preceding n-1

stimuli are taken into account in an nth-order
analysis.)

Using the

waveform of the cortical event-related potential as
the dependent measure, Squires, Wickens, Squires, and Donchin
(1976) reported similar

results.

Schvaneveldt and Chase (1969) examined fourth-order sequential

effects and found that subjects' expectancies obtained via verbal
pre-

dictions did not correspond well with sequential effects on reaction
time,

a

result consistent with that of Geller and Pitz (1970).

This

suggests that expectancy might be characterized using two components;
one would involve the subject's conscious expectancy (or prediction)

made on the basis of hypotheses conforming to probabilistic intuitions,
and the other could be

a

lower level, perhaps unconscious, expectancy

produced by the preceding stimulus sequence.

Together with the findings

regarding probability, the results of the above studies suggest that
there are at least three distinct factors operating in choice reaction
time tasks:

conscious expectancy, sequential expectancy, and stimulus

probability
The previous conclusion follows only if the assumption is made

that

a

subject is in either state E.
or E.

respect to
valid.

a

particular stimulus.

For example,

This assumption is not necessarily

model that assumes

a

(expects or does not) with

a

subject to be somewhere on

an expectancy continuum seems
equally plausible.
a

Thus, the finding of

probability effect for unpredicted
stimuli (for example) does not

necessarily imply that probability is
unexplainable in terms of expectancy.

The predicted stimulus may merely
have been the most expected

out of some set of expected stimuli.

More probable stimuli could tend

to fall higher on the expectancy
continuum than less probable ones,

so

expectancy would then be able to account for the
probability effect.
Furthermore, all of the studies previously mentioned in
this section have

a

serious shortcoming in light of the present discussion.

None has shown that

encoding level.

a

unique probability mechanism must exist at an

It is possible that the factors are independent at a

response level of processing, but conscious expectancy (for example)

underlies the probability effect at the perceptual level.

Such

state

a

of affairs would implicate a dynamic (rather than static) mechanism as

responsible for the probability effect at

a

perceptual level.

possibility was tested by Miller and Anbar (1981).

This

They attempted to

separate the effects of probability and conscious expectancy, but unlike

previous investigators, they also manipulated contrast, permitting conclusions regarding perceptual encoding.

Expectancies were induced by

providing subjects with

Miller and Anbar observed the

a

pretrial cue.

usual interaction of probability with contrast, but noted no tendency
for expectancy to interact with contrast.

This null result occurred in

one experiment in which probability was also manipulated, and in

a

second which varied only expectancy
and contrast.

probability is

a

This suggests that

factor distinct from conscious
expectancy at the

encoding level, since probability
is known to affect encoding, but
con
scious expectancy did not do so.

The conclusion is thus that

tively static probability mechanism
influences encoding.

a

dynamic

It is also possible that the factor
of sequential expec-

tancy, mentioned earlier, could function
according to such
ism;

rela-

However, con

scious expectancy is not the only factor
that might underlie

mechanism.

a

a

mechan-

expectancies would arise on the basis of the preceding
stimulus

sequence.

Experiments

2

and

3

examine the extent to which the effect

of probability at encoding may be explained by
sequential expectancy.

CHAPTER

II

EXPERIMENTS

Experiment

1

Miller (1979) concluded that stimulus
probability influences
encoding only when the stimuli can
be characterized by abstract codes
such as

a

name or dimensional value.

Although this conclusion is con-

sistent with results of previous experiments,
the evidence is not conclusive, since stimuli in these experiments
differed in ways other than
the degree to which they could be
characterized by abstract codes.

purpose of Experiment
abstract code as

a

1

was to provide

a

The

strong test of the role of the

mediator of the probability effect at encoding by

presenting the same stimuli in conditions which either encouraged
or

discouraged the use of abstract codes.
In his third experiment, Miller (1979) used letter stimuli and

found that the effects of contrast and probability were additive.

Usually, the use of alphanumeric stimuli has yielded

contrast interaction.

a

probability by

However, in this experiment, two versions of the

same uppercase letter were assigned to different responses so that the

stimulus names could not easily be used in making responses and were in
fact likely to interfere if they were used.

In the studies in which the

contrast by probability interaction has been observed (e.g., Miller,
1979, Experiment

1;

Miller and Pachella, 1973, 1976; Stanovich and

Pachella, 1977), it was possible, and in fact
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a

good strategy, to uti-
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lize the stimulus name in
performing the task.

On the basxs of this

difference, Miller implicated the
name code (and ultimately the abstract
code) as a key factor in the
mechanism responsible for the probability

effect at encoding.
It may be argued, however,

that some more subtle difference in the

stimuli, and not the availability of
an abstract code, was actually res-

ponsible for the disparate results.

The present experiment was an

attempt to rule out this possibility.
sented in two conditions.

The same four stimuli were pre-

One condition was designed to encourage the

use of abstract codes, while the other was
designed to discourage their
use.

According to the abstract code explanation, the probability
by

contrast interaction should be observed in the former condition,
and
be absent in the latter.

Method

.

Subjects

.

Forty-nine students at the University of Massachusetts

received course credit for their participation in an experimental session lasting about 40 minutes.

No subject exceeded a pre-experimental

criterion of 8% errors at either level of contrast.
subject were replaced because she lost

ment

a

The data of one

contact lens during the experi-

.

Apparatus and stimuli

.

A Hewlett-Packard 2114B computer controlled

the presentation of stimuli and recorded responses and response latencies.
a

Stimuli were presented on an HP1300A X-Y display oscilloscope in

dimly lit room.

located on

a

Responses were made by pressing one of two keys

response panel in front of the subj ect

.

Subj ects viewed
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the stimuli from
1

distance of about 100 on.

a

cm wide and 1.2 an high.

Contrast between

ground was reduced by placing

a

Stimuli were approximately
a

stimulus and its back-

1.5 log unit neutral densxty filter
in

front of the oscilloscope.
The stimulus set consisted of four
figures, each constructed so
as to be identifiable by two
names.

In the letter condition,

subjects

were told that the stimuli were two
uppercase versions of the letters
A and 0.
a

In the object condition, stimuli were
labelled as a table and

tepee (corresponding to the As), and

ponding to the 0s).

a

circle and

In the letter condition,

a

square (corres-

two stimuli were associ-

ated with each name, while in the object condition,
there was only one

stimulus per name.

The use of

a

simple name code was thus discouraged

in the letter condition, and encouraged in the object
condition.

Sub-

jects in the latter condition were told that the experiment was con-

cerned with how people identify letters written in different styles of
type.

Subjects in the object condition were told that the concern was

with how people identify simple drawings of objects.

When questioned

after the experiment, eight subjects in the letter condition reported
that they treated the stimuli as something other than letters.
others reported treating the stimuli as instructed.

All

Using the letter

names for reference, one letter from each pair was associated with

single response.

The pairing was the same for all subjects.

a

One pair

comprised the direct probability condition, the other pair, the indirect

probability condition
times in

a

.

Direct probability stimuli appeared 40 or 10

block of 100 trials, while each indirect probability stimulus

appeared 25 times.

Subjects were told that the stimuli would not neces-

.
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sarily appear an equal number
of times.

The assignment of stimulus

pairs to direct and indirect
conditions was counterbalanced
across subjects, as was the assignment
of stimuli to presentation
probabilities
within the direct probability
condition.
Pr ° CedUr --

trials each.

An ex P e rimental session
consisted of six blocks of 100

The first two blocks were
considered practice, and the

level of stimulus contrast
alternated from block to block.

Stimuli were

presented in random fashion by the
computer, subject to the constraint
that each stimulus appeared with the
appropriate frequency during
block.

trial

a

One half of the subjects were assigned
to the letter condition,

and the remaining subjects were assigned
to the object condition.

The

order of contrast level and type assignment
of preferred hand to probability condition (direct versus indirect) were
counterbalanced across
subj ects

Subjects were allowed approximately five minutes to dark adapt

before the first practice block.

period between blocks.

There was

a

one to two minute rest

A trial consisted of the presentation of a warn-

ing signal (two crosses above and below the location of the ensuing

stimulus) for 250 msec, with the stimulus appearing 250 msec after its
offset.

The stimulus remained on the screen until

a

response was made.

One second elapsed before the next warning signal, during which time
the screen remained blank or the word "error" was presented, depending

on the response.

Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and

accurately as possible.

RTs to error trials were recorded but not

analyzed, nor were RTs of two seconds or longer.
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w ^.^

For each Qf the last

biocks

^

sets of me an RTs and proportion
of correct responses (PC) were
confuted;
one set for the direct
probability condition, and one for the
indirect

condition.

each set.

Analyses of variance were performed
on the RTs and PC of
The analyses involved three
within-subject variables (two

levels each of probability, contrast,
and practice), and four between-

subject variables.

The latter consisted of label condition
(letter

versus object), order of contrast
alternation (beginning with high
versus low), mapping condition (which of
the two pairs of stimuli were

presented in the probability condition of interest),
and hand used to
respond (preferred or not).

assigning Blocks

3

The practice variable was constructed by

and 4 to one level, and

D irect probability condition

condition are summarized in Table
stimuli (F(l,32) = 98.72, p

<

and

5

RTs were shorter for more probable

1.

.001,

MS_

e

= 5,507),
<

jects responded about 25 msec faster in Blocks
<

.001, MS

g

to the other.

Results of the direct probability

.

high level of contrast (F(l,32) = 204.22, p

(F(l,32) = 25.38, p

6

= 2,350).

and for stimuli at the

.001, MS
5

and

6

= 7,964).

£

than in

Suband 4

3

The predicted label condition

by contrast by probability interaction did not approach significance
(p >

.10), and the trend in the data was in fact opposite to that antici

pated.

The probability effect was 16 msec greater at low contrast than

at high contrast in the letter condition (F(l,l6) = 3.32,

.

05 <

p_

<

.10,

MS ^ = 960), and virtually the same at both contrast levels in the object

condition (F

<

was due to

speed-accuracy trade-off.

a

1).

There was no suggestion that any of these effects
More probable stimuli were

responded to more accurately (F(l,32) = 25.81, p

<

.001,

=

MS_

e

.004),
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and this effect was
unchanged by lahel condition
(F

<

1 )

.

There was

no effect of contrast,
nor evidence of a probability
by contrast interaction, in the overall
analysis or in separate analyses
performed on
the PC data of each label
condition (F < 1 in all instances).

These results are inconclusive
with respect to the role of an
abstract code as a mediator of the
probability effect at encoding,

On

the basis of Miller's
(1979) observation of an additive relationship

between contrast and probability when
more than one stimulus was
assigned to

a

name,

a

similar relationship between the two factors
was

predicted in the letter condition of the
present experiment.
abstract code is important, then

a

If an

probability by contrast interaction

should have been observed in the object
condition.

The finding of

a

marginal interaction in the letter condition
suggests that subjects in
this condition may have invented their own names
for some of the stimuli, a strategy to which some subjects admitted.

However, the absence

of the interaction in the object condition is problematic
for this

interpretation.

Perhaps it is critical to the abstract code explanation

that these codes be extremely well learned.

This would be the case for

alphanumeric stimuli, as in the letter condition, but possibly not for
names of the object stimuli.

Subjects in the letter condition might

have used the letter names for stimuli in the direct probability condition, and used invented names for indirect probability stimuli.

Since

only some portion of the subjects should have retained the letter names
for the direct probability stimuli, the finding of

marginally significant interaction

is thus

a

relatively small,

in keeping with this view.

This interpretation is obviously speculative, and is offered merely as
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some attempt to account for
the present results.
The RT analysis also revealed

number of theoretically uninterest-

a

ing interactions, which will
be reported with no interpretation.

The

effect of probability was greater
when subjects responded with their

preferred hand (F(l,32) = 5.15,
p

<

.05, MS

g

= 5,507).

The probability

effect was relatively larger in opposing
mapping conditions across
label conditions (F(l,32) = 7.13,
p

<

.05, MS_

e

= 5,507).

Similarly,

the practice effect was differentially
affected by the order of contrast

alternation across mapping conditions (F(l,32) =
7,65, p

.01,

MS

=

Finally, the contrast by probability interaction was
observed

2,350).

primarily in Blocks

3

and 4 when the high contrast condition was pre-

sented first, but not in Blocks
(F(l,32) = 5.45, p

<

.05, MS_

e

5

and

a

6

when low contrast came first

= 2,511).

Indirect probability condition
termed

<

.

Miller (1979) observed what he

reverse error rate effect for indirect stimuli in an experiment

much like the present letter condition.

He suggested that the name of

the most probable (.40) stimulus became associated more strongly with
the response to direct probability stimuli, while the name of the least

probable (.10) stimulus was associated with the hand used in the indirect probability condition.
fere with the execution of

a

The more probable name would then inter-

correct response in the indirect condition,

whereas the less probable name would tend to activate

correct response

This should only happen when the same name is used

in this condition.

to respond to stimuli requiring different responses.

Miller's finding,

a

a

On the basis of

reverse probability effect was expected in the PC

data, RT data, or both, but only in the letter condition.
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Analyses of the RT data for each
label condition revealed virtually
no effect in the object
condition, and a slight trend in the
direction

opposite to that expected xn the letter
condition (F

<

1

in both cases).

Results from the PC data were parallel,
the effect failing to approach

significance in either label condition (both
ps

>

.25).

These results

are consistent with the interpretation
given for the observation of
the probability by contrast interaction
for letter stimuli in the direct

probability condition.

The failure to observe even

a

trend toward

a

reverse probability effect for letters in the
indirect condition suggests that subjects might have used more names than
those provided to

perform the task.

Experiment

2

Miller and Anbar (1981) demonstrated that expectancy as generated
by a pretrial cue did not interact with contrast.

Since the probability

by contrast interaction has been observed in a number of studies, they

reasoned that the effect of probability at encoding is not explainable
in terms of expectancy.

However, this conclusion may not generalize to

expectancies induced in other ways.

One alternative cause of expectan-

cies is the stimulus sequence leading up to

a

particular trial

.

As pre-

viously discussed, sequential expectancy might underlie the probability
effect at encoding because more probable stimuli tend to be repeated
more often.

If so,

it should be possible to show that the magnitude of

sequential effects increases as contrast decreases
lar to that of Miller and Anbar,

.

By reasoning simi-

if sequential effects are not influ-

enced by contrast, it may be concluded that sequential effects do not
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underlie the probability effect
at encoding.

This conclusion would be

warranted more strongly if an additive
relationship between sequence and
contrast was demonstrated concurrently
with a probability by contrast
interaction.

Without

a

concurrent demonstration of effects, the
logic

of the experiment may require
sequential expectancy to account for

nonexistent effect of probability at encoding.

a

Consequently, probabil-

ity was manipulated along with contrast
in the present experiment, and

sequential effects were examined.

Method

.

Subjects.

Twenty-six students at the University of Massachusetts

received course credit for their participation in an experimental
session lasting about 40 minutes.

The data of two subjects were replaced

because they exceeded the 8% error criterion at

a

single level of con-

trast.

Procedure

.

The procedure was the same as that of Experiment

with several exceptions.
S,

and K.

They were about

1,

The stimuli were the uppercase letters G, N,
.7

cm wide and 1.2 cm high.

One pair of

stimuli was assigned to each response, and the pairs were always G-N and
S-K.

The pairs were constructed such that one globally curved and one

globally angular letter were members of each pair.

The stimuli were

described to subjects as four letters.

Probability was manipulated over
continuous nature of the effect.
frequencies of 10 or 40 in

a

a

range of values to examine the

The members of one pair appeared with

block of 100 trials, and members of the

other pair appeared 20 or 30 times.

The eight possible assignments of
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stimuli to probabilities are shown
in Table

2.

Finally, the absolute

level of stimulus contrast was
decreased in order to increase the size
of the contrast effect.

Resu lts and disc ussion.

Analyses related to the probability effect
will

be considered first, followed by
analyses of sequential effects.

Only

data from the last four trial blocks
were analyzed.

Probability analyses
mean RTs.

.

An analysis of variance was performed on the

The analysis involved one between-subj ects
variable, the

order of contrast alternation (two levels), and
three within-subj ects
variables.

The latter consisted of contrast and practice (each
two

levels), and probability (four levels).

Table
p <

RTs increased with decreasing probability (F(3,66) = 22.25,

3.

.001, MS

Experiment
139.25,

p_

e

e

The effect of contrast was larger than in

(236 versus 120 msec), and highly significant (F(l,22) =

1

<

= 4,695).

.001, MS

faster in Blocks

—

Results are summarized in

= 8,890).

5

e

and

= 38,515).
6

than in

As expected,

Subjects responded about 26 msec
3

and 4 (F(l,22) = 7.15, p

e

= 2,731).

<

No other effects approached significance.

suggestion that any of the above effects was due to
trade-off.

.05,

the magnitude of the probability effect

tended to be greater at low contrast (F(3,66) = 4.66, p
MS_

<

a

.01,

There was no

speed-accuracy

More probable stimuli were responded to more accurately

(F(3,66) = 24.07, p

<

.001,

MS_

e

and the contrast effect

= .0014),

approached significance (F(l,22) = 3.81,

.

05

<

p

<

.10,

=

MS_

.0020).

e

The contrast by probability interaction did not approach significance
(p >

.10).

.

TABLE 2

Assignments of stimuli to probability
for Experiment
(response pairs were always G-N and
S-K)

Probability

Condition

^1

^2

1

N

K

S

2

G

K

S

3

N

S

K

4

G

s

K

5

K

N

G

6

S

N

G

7

K

G

N

8

S

G

N

.

3

TABLE

3

Mean reaction times (in msec) and
proportion of correct responses
Cm parentheses) for Experiment 2.

Probability

Low contrast
llifth

contrast

10

•20

.30

.40

(.902)

760 (.960)

716 (.969)

708 (.972)

538 (.935)

516 (.968)

506 (.972)

480 (.980)

.

801

Both the logogen and the verification
models predict that the
effect of probability on reaction
time should be greater at low contrast.

Although there was

a

significant interaction between probability

and contrast level which reflected

a

general tendency for contrast

effects to be larger for lower levels of
probability, there was
sal between probability levels
a

.4 and

.3

(see Table 3).

a

rever-

The results of

trend analysis, however, indicated that only
the linear components of

the probability effect differed significantly
at the two levels of con-

trast (F(l,22) = 10.38, p

<

.01,

MS
e

= 2,299).

Furthermore, analyses of

the data at each contrast level indicated that for both
levels, only
the linear component of the probability effect was significant
(at low

contrast, F(l,22) = 55.62,
£

£(1,22) = 36.19, £

<

.001, MS^ = 4,528;

.001, MS^ = 2,220).

<

at high contrast,

It may therefore be concluded

that probability had its predicted effect at encoding.

Sequential analyses

.

In the previous section,

it was established

that probability affected encoding in the present experiment.

Given

the presence of this effect, it is reasonable to ask if sequential

expectancy is the underlying mechanism for it.

If so,

by contrast interaction should be present in the data.

sequential effects at

a

.

only for trials in the
(e.g., Remington,

a

sequence

By examining

constant probability level, the effect of prob-

ability may be prevented from contributing to
contrast interaction

then

a

potential sequence by

Accordingly, sequential effects were examined
.4

probability condition.

1969; Schvaneveldt and Chase,

significant fourth-order sequential effects.

Several investigators
1969) have observed

The preceding three

stimuli were therefore taken into account in the present analyses.

There were not enough observations
at each sequence level to permit

analyses at probability levels of
£

<

.4.

A two (order of contrast alternation)
by two (contrast level) by

eight (sequence) analysis of variance was
performed on the RT data.
results are summarized in Table

significant (F(l,22) = 108.37,
E

4.
<

The

The 228 msec effect of contrast was
.001, MS
e

= 46,184), as was the

effect of preceding sequence (F(7,154) =
21.35, g

<

.001, MS
e

= 4,055).

Consistent with past observations of sequential effects
(e.g.,

Schvaneveldt and Chase, 1969), it is apparent in Table

4

that RT

decreases with increasing run length, and tends to increase
with lag
(the number of intervening trials between stimulus presentations).

The

sequence by contrast interaction was not significant (F(7,154) =
1.65,

£

>

.10,

MS ^ = 2,872).

The failure to observe this interaction pro-

vides no evidence suggesting that the probability effect at encoding is

explainable in terms of sequential expectancy, since probability interacted with contrast in the same experiment, thereby demonstrating

a

probability effect at encoding in the absence of sequential effects
there.

However, this conclusion should be accepted with caution.

Ninety-five percent confidence intervals were obtained for the contrast
effect for each sequence

.

They revealed that differences of 20 to 40

msec in the size of the effect across sequences (the magnitude typically

observed in probability by contrast interactions) could have gone undetected.

For example, the 95% confidence interval for the contrast

effect in the BBB condition extended from 271 to 173 msec.
condition, the interval extended from 255 to 141 msec.

In the AAA

Stimuli in the

latter condition should be expected more strongly, so it is possible

\

\

I
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that the effect of contrast may
have been greater for unexpected stimuli.

Furthermore, there appears to be

a

slight tendency for the con-

trast effect to be greater for
sequences that would produce incorrect

expectancies.

While sequential expectancy does not
appear to be

a

likely candidate for the mechanxsm
underlying the effect of probability
at encoding, this possibility cannot
be completely ruled out due to the

ambiguity of the observed null result.

Experiment

3

In order to achieve a more conclusive result
regarding the rela-

tionship of sequential expectancy and probability at encoding,
Experi-

ment

was replicated, with several minor changes.

2

The most significant

of these was that only two levels of probability were used
(.05 and
to allow a greater number of observations to be made for the

.45),

sequential analysis.
those of Experiment

The rationale and predictions were identical to
2.

In addition,

the repeated finding of additivity

between the effects of sequence and contrast would strengthen the conclusion that sequential expectancies are not responsible for the prob-

ability effect at encoding.

Method

.

Subj ects

.

Thirty-three students at the University of Massachusetts

received course credit for their participation in an experimental session lasting about 40 minutes.

because the 8% criterion at
Procedure.

a

The data of one subject were replaced

single level of contrast was exceeded.

The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 2,

43

with several exceptions.
•05 and

There were two levels of stimulus
probability,

One member of each letter pair
(G-N and S-K) was assigned

.45.

to each level.

This provided 180 observations per
subject in the

sequential analysis, as opposed to 80 in
Experiment
of stimuli to probabilities are
shown in Table 5.

2.

The assignments

An initial practice

block was added; subjects always viewed
stimuli in this block at the
high contrast level so that they would be
familiar with them when seen
for the first time at low contrast.

contrast was raised

a

Lastly, the absolute level of

small amount relative to Experiment

2

in order to

make stimuli in the dim condition slightly easier to see.

Results

a nd

discussion

.

Analyses related to the probability effect will

be considered first, followed by analyses of sequential effects.

Only

data from the last four trial blocks were analyzed.

Probability analyses

mean RTs

.

.

An analysis of variance was performed on the

The analysis involved two between-subj ects variables, the

order of contrast alternation (two levels), and stimulus-to-probability

mapping condition (four levels).
(each two levels) were:

probability.

The four within-subj ects variables

hand used to respond, practice, contrast, and

Results are summarized in Table

6.

Subjects responded

about 19 msec faster with their preferred hands (F(l,24) = 8.91,

£

<

MS ^ = 5,089), and were about 21 msec faster in Blocks 6 and

.01,

than in

4

and

5

(F(l,24) = 10.48, p

<

.01, MS

effect was about 156 msec (F(l,24) = 82.56,

p_

= 5,502).

e
<

7

The contrast

.001, hS^ = 37,636),

and

more probable stimuli were responded to faster than less probable stimuli (F(l,24) = 126.51, p

<

.001,

MS_

e

= 29,808).

The probability effect

TABLE

5

Assignments of stimuli to
probabilities for Experiment
(.response pairs were always G-N
and S-K)
.

Condition
1

2

3

High probability (.45)

G,S

G,K

N,S

Low probability

N,K

N,S

G,K

(.05)

3

45

TABLE 6

Mean RTs (in msec) and proportion
of correct
(m parentheses) for Experiment 3. responses

Probability
05

.45

Low contrast

781

(.927)

598 (.981)

High contrast

614 (.433)

453 (.983)

e
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(172 msec) was considerably larger
than in Experiments
it was about 75 msec),

and 2 (in which

1

reflecting the more extreme probability
values

used in the present experiment.

The probability effect was 22 msec

greater at low contrast than at
high contrast and this interaction

approached significance (1(1,24) =
3.80,

.

05 < p
— <

.10, MS
e

= 4 169)J
>

'

An analysxs of the PC data collapsing
over practice revealed that prob-

ability was the only variable to have an
effect (F(l,24) = 27.24,
p_

<

.001, MS

e

=

.0065).

Thus, none of the RT effects were due to a

speed-accuracy trade-off.

The finding that the probability by contrast

interaction was only marginally significant was
interpreted as most
likely being an instance of Type II error.

The interaction has been

observed numerous times in experiments using alphanumeric
stimuli (as
cited in the introduction), was observed in Experiment

and was very

2,

close to significance in the present experiment (p = .06).

It therefore

seems safe to conclude that the difference in magnitude of the prob-

ability effect across contrast conditions is real.
Two unpredicted interactions were present in the RT analysis which

could not be interpreted or meaningfully described in

a

concise manner.

One was the mapping condition by order of contrast alternation by practice by contrast interaction (F(3,24) = 3.35, p

<

.05,

MS_

e

= 3,226),

and

the other was the mapping by order by contrast by probability interac= 3.08, p
tion (F(3,24)
—
—

<

—

.05, MS

= 4,169).

Since each cell of these

interactions contained data from only four subjects, these effects may
have been produced by

a

few atypical subjects whose impact on the cell

means could have been fairly substantial.

Sequential analyses

.

The data of eight subjects were not available

for the sequential analysis
due to experimenter error.

Consequently,

the RT data of the 24 remaining
subjects were analyzed with regard to

probability effects.
there was

This was necessary in order to
ascertain whether

significant probability effect at encoding
demonstrated by

a

these subjects for sequential
expectancy to explain.

The between-

subjects variables of mapping condition and
order of contrast alternation were not included in the analysis.

Table

E
MS

<

e

Results are summarized in

There were main effects of contrast (F(l,23) =
44.95,

7.

.001, MS

e

= 47,925) and probability

(F(l,23) = 77.15,

p_

<

.001,

= 38,687), but their interaction was not significant (F(l,23) =

1.93, p

>

.10,

MS

e

= 5,591).

The size of the interaction is virtually

identical to that obtained using the data of all 32 subjects,
so this
subset was probably not qualitatively different.
A two (practice) by two (contrast) by eight (sequence) analysis of

variance was performed on the RT data.
8.

Results are summrized in Table

The effects of practice (F(l,23) = 8.42, p

contrast (F(l,23) = 57.86, p

<

(F(7,161) = 20.00,

MS_

Experiment

2,

p_

<

.001,

.001, MS

e

e

= 64,

<

.01,

MS

= 8,497),

751), and sequence

= 4,667) were all significant.

As in

it appears that RT decreases as run length increases, and

tends to increase with lag.

trast (F(7,161) = 1.24,

p_

>

Sequential effects did not vary with con.10,

=

MS_

e

1,963).

Ninety-five percent con

fidence intervals were calculated for the contrast effect for each
sequence.

While narrower than those in Experiment

2,

they still indi-

cated that contrast effects could be larger for sequences that usually

produce incorrect expectancies.

The virtual absence of any such trend

does not support this possibility, however.
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TABLE

7

Mean RTs (in msec) of the 24 subjects
whose data were
used in the sequential analysis
of Experiment 3.

Probability
•05

.45

Low contrast

784

5g?

High contrast

62 4

458

—

\

\
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As in Experiment 2, the
evidence is consistent with the lack of
a

sequential expectancy effect at
encoding, but is weak.
note in this regard was the
failure to observe
by contrast interaction.

As stated earlier,

a

Of particular

significant probability

there may not have been

a

probability effect at encoding for
sequential expectancies to explain.
Together with the null result of Experiment

2,

though, the total absence

of any indication of sequential
effects at encoding in the present ex-

periment suggests that the probability effect
at encoding does not arise
from sequential expectancies.

An alternative to this conclusion and an

experiment that could strengthen (or weaken)
the next section.

it

will

he discussed in

CHAPTER

III

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments were
conducted in order to further develop
a

description of the mechanism by which
stimulus probability affects

perceptual encoding.

The first experiment was an attempt to
provide

strong evidence for the role of an abstract
code as

probability mechanism.

a

Its results were inconclusive.

mediator in the
The second and

third experiments suggested that the probability
effect at encoding
could not be explained in terms of sequential
expectancies.
As mentioned, Experiment

1

was designed to test the importance of

the notion of an abstract code as
at encoding.

a

mediator of the probability effect

The observed pattern of results, together with the pos-

sibility that subjects did not follow instructions in the letter condition, make it difficult to assess the importance of such a code in the

probability mechanism.
differ from

a

However, whether the abstract code involved must

name code is open to question.

The only suggestion of

a

probability effect at encoding was in the letter condition, in which the
stimulus names would have been very well learned.
of an effect at encoding in the object condition,

There was no evidence
in which names would

not have been as strongly associated to the stimuli.
the exception of Miller's (1979) Experiment 4,

a

Furthermore, with

probability effect at

encoding has never been demonstrated using anything but alphanumeric
stimuli.

The small amount of evidence supporting the importance of

abstract codes, combined with the difficulty in precisely defining them
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(see Miller's Experiments
4 and 6,

abandon the notion of
the absence of

a

of Experiment

1

be effective,

a

1979), suggests that it is unw.se to

simple name code as

a

a

mediator.

In addition,

probability effect at encoding in the
object condition
suggests that

mediating code must be well learned to

a

status that arbitrary abstract codes
(such as stimulus

dimensions) are not likely to have.

Experiments

2

and

3

were designed to test the notion that the
prob-

ability effect at encoding was
fects.

a

result of sequential expectancy ef-

The probability effect may be

a

reflection of the fact that

more probable stimuli are repeated and hence
expected more often.

The

results of the present experiments did not support
this explanation.

Although not as unequivocally as might be desired,

a

probability effect

at encoding was demonstrated in the absence of sequential
expectancy

effects there.

In similar experiments, Miller and Anbar (1981) demon-

strated the probability effect at encoding in the absence of
general expectancy effect there.
use of

a

pretrial cue.)

a

more

(Expectancy was induced through the

It may now be useful to return to the models

presented in the introduction in order to understand the implications of
these findings.

Mechanisms and Causes of the Probability Effect

The logogen model accounted for the probability effect at encoding
by assuming that the activation thresholds of logogens corresponding to

probable stimuli are lowered.

The probability by contrast interaction

follows if it is assumed that the effect of contrast manipulation is on
the rate of evidence accrual.

The verification model assumes that con-

trast affects the processing
mechanism in two places (sensory memory
and feature analysis) for
unexpected stimuli, but only sensory
memory
is affected

when stimuli are correctly
expected.

If one assumes that

more probable stimuli are correctly
expected more often, the probability
by contrast interaction follows
directly.
It should be noted that these
are models of the probability effect

at a certain locus, and as such, do
not address the issue of how the

effect is generated.

One manner in which the latter issue may
be

addressed is to look for expectancy effects at
encoding to determine
their ability to account for the probability
effect there.
the method used in Experiments

2

and

3

This was

and by Miller and Anbar (1981).

The conclusion that general or sequential expectancies
underlie the

probability effect implies that the mechanism ought to be fairly
dynamic.

The conclusion that the probability effect is not

of these factors implies

a

more static mechanism.

a

result of one

There is nothing

inherent in either the logogen or verification model that requires

a

conclusion about the degree to which the mechanism is static or dynamic.
For example, one could assume that logogen thresholds were adjusted on

a

trial to trial basis, or that the expectancy set of the verification

model remained fixed over trials.

The logogen model would then be

dynamic, and the verification model, static.

The manner of adjustment

could be assigned in just the opposite way, however, so it should be
clear that these models do not address this issue.

Rather, they are

accounts of what might be occurring at encoding to produce

a

probability

by contrast interaction.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3, together with those of Miller
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and Anbar (1981) suggest that
the mechanism which is responsxble
for the

probability effect is
anism is

a

a

static one.

A possible candidate for this mech-

process in which subjects monitor the
relatxve frequencies of

stimuli over some period of trials
(see Hasher and Zacks, 1979), and
then set their expectancies accordingly,
adjusting them little, if at
all, once they are set.

This conclusion is consistent with both the

logogen and verification models, as described
above.
The previous conclusion should be accepted
with caution.

An exam-

ination of confidence intervals suggested the possibility
that the size
of the contrast effect in Experiments 2 and
3 might have varied with

sequential expectancy, but the experiments lacked sufficient
power to
detect the interaction.

Confidence intervals obtained by Miller and

Anbar (1981) revealed that this alternative conclusion was also viable
for their study.

Under any circumstances, it is unwise to accept

conclusion based on so few observations of

Miller and Anbar'

s

a

null result.

a

Furthermore,

conclusion that expectancy does not underlie the

probability effect may be challenged on other grounds.

They conducted

two experiments in which they failed to observe an expectancy by con-

trast interaction.

In the first, probability was also manipulated, and

the probability by contrast interaction was observed in the PC data, but

not the RT data.

lated at all.

In the second experiment, probability was not manipu-

In both experiments,

the RT data were examined for the

presence of the expectancy by contrast interaction.
onstrate

a

The failure to dem-

probability by contrast interaction for the RT data leaves

their experiments open to the same criticism that was applied to Experi-

ment

2 of

the present study; namely, that it is a questionable practice

to require expectancy
effects to explain a probability
effect at encod-

ing that may not be present
in the data under consideration.

Another potential criticism of
Miller and Anbar's study

is

that

their cuing procedure may have
yielded an expectancy effect that is

qualitatively different from that which
occurs in
tion time task.
themselves.

a

typical choice reac-

This is because their pretrial cues were
the stimuli

Subjects may have adopted

a

strategy of preparing the res-

ponse to the cued stimulus when the cue was
presented, and then performing

a

physical comparison of target to cue when the stimulus
was

presented.

If there was a match,

the prepared response could be

executed purely on the basis of the physical comparison;
if not, the
stimulus would have to be identified before

a

response could be exe-

cuted.

a

similar strategy to

Pacheila and Miller (1976) proposed

account for the absence of
trials in

a

a

probability effect for physical match

letter matching task.

is that stimulus

The critical aspect of this strategy

identification is not necessary when the cue is valid.

However, there is reason to believe that the identification process is

heavily involved in the probability effect at encoding.

By using

a

task

that permits this process to be bypassed when cues are valid (thereby

producing an expectancy effect), Miller and Anbar may have made their
conclusions based on

a

type of expectancy effect that does not involve

stimulus identification.

The possibility remains, however, that expec-

tancy may influence identification in other tasks (i.e., tasks in which
the above strategy is not useful), and in so doing, produce the prob-

ability effect at encoding.
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I^J^lidity^t he

Additive Factor
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The present experiments, and
all of the studies that have manipulated contrast in concluding
that probability affects encoding, may
be

subjected to
point.

a

more fundamental criticism than
those discussed to this

The assumption underlying all of
this work is that processing

is conducted by a series of
discrete stages and that, while contrast

may affect the rate of processing within
the stage or stages responsible
for encoding, the contrast manipulation
does not affect the quality of

the output of any stage.

That is, given enough time, the quality of

the output for any stage in the low contrast
condition will match the

quality for that stage in the high contrast condition.

If output is

affected, it is possible that the effects of contrast could be
passed

down the line of processing stages, so to speak, and the conclusion
that

a

manipulation influences an early stage of processing because it

interacts with contrast would not follow.
The assumption that contrast affects only the rate of processing

gains some support from the observation by Pachella and Fisher (1969)

that contrast affected the rate, but not the asymptote, of information

accrual in

a

discrimination task.

However, there is reason to question

the generalizability of this conclusion to the effect of contrast as it

has been manipulated in probability studies.

In order to observe con-

trast effects of the size typical of these studies (125 to 250 msec),
the luminance at low contrast must be very low.

In the present experi-

ments, the probability by contrast interaction was observed in the data
of roughly 60% of the subjects, and a small number of individuals con-

tributed heavily to its overall
magnitude.

This suggests the possrbil-

ity that, at least for some
subjects, the effect of contrast
might have
been on the quality of the
output of some process. For these
subjects,
it may have been the case
that no matter how long they viewed
a stimu-

lus, the quality of what they
saw never reached the level obtained
at

high contrast.

Until the effect of contrast as it has
been manipulated

in probability studies is shown
to be on the rate, and not the asymp-

tote, of information accrual, the
additive factors interpretation of

the probability effect on encoding
based on the observed probability by

contrast interaction is open to question.

Similarly, if one assumes

continuous flow of information rather than

a

there exists more than one interpretation of

interaction (McClelland, 1979).

a

discrete stage process,
a

probability by contrast

Miller (1982) has provided some evi-

dence against this notion, showing that

a

task similar to those used

in probability studies involved fairly discrete stages.

Given the

importance of this assumption, further evidence is desirable.

Probability as

a

Manipulation of Expectancy in General

In the introduction,

may serve as

a

it was suggested that stimulus probability

model of expectancy effects in general.

It is thus

reasonable to ask whether other types of expectancies have exerted
effects at encoding similar to those of probability.

In both a lexi-

cal decision and a naming task, Becker and Killion (1977) observed that

the effect of semantic priming varied inversely with contrast.

Stanovich and West (1979) observed

predictive sentence context in

a

a

similar result for the effect of

naming task.

The findings that the

a

effects of other types of
expectancy have varied with contrast
suggests
that probability is not an
isolated instance of some form of
expectancy
which is capable of exerting an
effect at encoding. The xnterpretatxon

provided by Stanovich and West for
their results is noteworthy in this
regard, for it suggests still
another interpretation for the probability

by contrast interaction.

Stanovich and West used the distinction of

Posner and Snyder (1975) between
process and

a

a

fast, automatic spreadxng activation

slower process by which conscious attention
is focussed.

Only facilitation results from the first
process, while the second
results in both facilitation and inhibition
effects.

They reasoned that

only the first process occurred under high
contrast conditions in their
task, because the interval between context and
target was too short to

allow the attentional process to act.

The effect of low contrast, then,

was to slow down the early processing of the stimulus
so that the con-

scious attention mechanism had time to act.

Stanovich and West argued

that anything that increases the interval between the presentation of

context and the target should produce

a

similar interaction.

Thus, con-

trast is equated with all forms of degradation, and the mere passage of
time, under this interpretation.

Stanovich and West also manipulated

the time between context and target presentation, and obtained results

consistent with their interpretation.
If the probability mechanism is a dynamic one,

then this interpre-

tation of expectancy by contrast interactions would seem to have testable predictions.

For example, if the expectancies involved in

ability task arose on

a

a

prob-

trial to trial basis, the expectancy on trial n

should be different from the expectancy on trial n+1.

Given these

shifting expectancies and the
Stanovich and West interpretation,
the
duration of the intertrial
interval (HI) should be an i.portant
variable.

With short His, the conscious
attention mechanism should not
have time to act.
While ITI has never been systematically
manipulated
in a probability experiment,

it has varied across studies,
with no dis-

cernable effect on the probability
by contrast interaction.
On the other hand, if the probability
mechanism is fairly static,
it is not clear how Stanovich and
West's interpretation would apply.

That is, it is unclear to what the interval
between the arisen expec-

tancy and the onset of
is

a

stimulus would correspond, since the expectancy

presumably constant given

static mechanism.

a

This indirectly

raises the question of the utility of stimulus
probability as

expectancy effects in general at encoding.
is

shown to be static, its utility as

a

a

model of

If the probability mechanism

model would be questionable,

since it seems doubtful that more ecologically valid types of
expectancies (such as context effects that might arise during reading) are of

such a stable nature.

If the probability mechanism is of a fairly dyna-

mic nature, however, it would consequently be much more similar to
other, inherently more interesting, types of expectancies.

Given the

vast literature on dynamic expectancies during choice reaction time
tasks, the exact nature of an expectancy at

a

given point in time could

conceivably be evaluated more precisely than would be possible when
studying more complex forms of expectancy.

mechanism could well serve as

a

Thus,

a

dynamic probability

basis for developing an explicit model

of the effects of expectancy over time on the perceptual encoding

process
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Future Directions
The potential utility of the
probability mechanism as

a

model of

expectancy effects in general
argues for the further investigation
of
the issues that have been raised
by this and other research regarding
the nature of the probability
effect at encoding.

In light of the pre-

vious discussion, the foremost
question is that of the static versus

dynamic nature of the effect.

To the extent that the effect is dynamic,

it should be possible to demonstrate
the effect of some form of dynamic

(e.g., sequential) expectancy at
encoding.

One way of doing this might

be to include runs of only a few set
lengths in a trial block.

These

run lengths could be chosen such that they
would be likely to induce the

largest possible sequential expectancy effect.
case should be difficult to attribute to

a

A mill

result in this

lack of power, since it would

accompany the finding of large effects obtained with many
observations
per subject.

Alternatively, probability might be manipulated, with run

length controlled such that sequential effects would be minimal.

If

sequential expectancy underlies the probability effect at encoding, the

prediction would be that

a

probability by contrast interaction should

not be observable in this situation.

A cuing experiment similar to

those of Miller and Anbar (1981) could also demonstrate an expectancy

effect at encoding.

The key difference would be to use cues that were

symbolic, and not identical to the target stimuli.

The physical compar-

ison strategy discussed earlier would thus not be possible.
A second issue

name code as

a

regarding the probability effect is the role of

mediator of the effect.

Is

the appeal to an abstract

a

code that is more general
than

Experiment

4

a

name code necessary?

could be replicated using other
stimuli that are seemingly

identifiable using abstract codes.
than

a

Miller's (1979)

The demand for

a

code more abstract

name ought to be firmly
established before the notion of

name code as mediator is abandoned.

The importance of

a

a

simple

name code might

be firmly established by an
experiment similar to the present Experi-

ment

1.

Proceeding on the assumption that
alphanumeric stimuli must be

used to observe the probability
effect at encoding, Hebrew letters might
be used as stimuli, and subjects
would be grouped into readers and non-

readers of Hebrew.

If the existence of a well learned name
code is

critical, the probability by contrast interaction
should be observed in
data of the first group, but not the second.

Another issue concerns the validity of additive factors
logic in
localizing the probability effect at encoding.
to that of Pachella and Fisher (1969)

An experiment analogous

is needed to show that the effect

of contrast as manipulated in probability experiments is on the rate,

and not the asymptote, of information accrual.

To further support the

validity of the additive factors logic in probability experiments,

a

procedure advocated by Meyer and Irwin (1981) might be employed to evaluate the nature of the flow of information (continuous versus discrete)
in the task used to observe the probability by contrast interaction.

Finally, the probability effect may be studied with the specific
intent of generalizing the results to other forms of expectancy.

For

example, the interpretation offered by Stanovich and West (1979) to

account for expectancy by contrast interactions is very different from
that of Becker (1980; Becker and Killion,

1977).

Without going into

details, the former predicts
that the interaction should only
be
observed in conjunction with
an expectancy induced inhibition
effect,
while the latter yields the
prediction that only facilitation-dominated

expectancy effects should interact
with contrast.

The comparatively

uncomplicated nature of the probability
manipulation may allow insights
regarding expectancy that lead to
the resolution of this issue.
In conclusion, the results of the
present experiments were not in

favor of the notion of the stimulus
probability effect as

a

general

model of expectancy effects at encoding,
since they suggested
rather than

a

dynamic mechanism.

However,

a

a

static,

number of reasons for not

accepting this conclusion were offered, and it
was suggested that the
potential utility of the probability mechanism as

a

model warrants fur-

ther investigation of issues pertaining to the nature
of the stimulus

probability effect.

This course of action could ultimately result in

fairly precise description of the ongoing effects of expectancy on
the

perceptual encoding process.

a
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